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ABSTRACT
Automatic verification of cyber-physical systems (CPS) typically involves
computing the reachable set of states of such systems. This computation is
known to be exponential in the number of continuous variables. For systems
that can be decomposed into separate components with lower dimensionality,
we present an algorithm that verifies global safety properties of the complete
system using the reach sets of the components. Here, the components are only
coupled through a shared time variable. Using a satellite system case study,
we are able to show significant savings in memory and runtime computation
costs for this approach. For systems whose components are coupled through
additional continuous variables, we present an abstraction to overapproxi-
mate the interaction between the components such that the aforementioned
algorithm can be used. The feasibility of this abstraction is demonstrated
experimentally, which also shows additional work is necessary to develop a
more efficient abstraction.
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Computing systems that control physical processes have become common-
place in safety-critical applications such as vehicle control and industrial
automation. Design and operation of these cyber-physical systems (CPS)
should provide a high level of assurance because failures and misbehaviors
can lead to significant financial, environmental, and societal losses. A notable
recent example was the recall of around 400,000 Prius hybrid cars in 2010
that had a faulty antilock braking system which failed under certain road
conditions [1]. Another design and operational mishap occurred on February
10, 2009, when the Iridium 33, a U.S. operational communications satellite,
and Cosmos 2251, a Russian decommissioned communications satellite, col-
lided [2]. Aside from the financial costs, the collision created large amounts
of space debris that will remain in low earth orbit for several years, posing
additional hazards to other satellites.
Although high assurance is a desirable goal, as the systems become more
sophisticated, it is becoming more and more challenging to attain using stan-
dard design methodologies. The standard technique for detecting design flaws
is based on testing and simulations. Since the correctness of these systems
crucially depends on the complex interactions between the computing and
physical elements, it is difficult and in some cases it is impossible to cover
the set of all possible behaviors with a finite number of simulations or tests.
Furthermore, the simulation tools often lack precise semantics. This makes
it impossible to arrive at rigorous assurance guarantees from the simulation
runs.
Formal verification provides an alternative to these approaches. This ap-
proach involves first building a mathematical model for the system (with
precise semantics), and then using deductive or algorithmic techniques to
establish properties about all possible behaviors of the model in one go. The
most common algorithmic approach involves computing the set of reachable
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states of the model. This enables one to check if any of those reachable
states are unsafe or “bad”. Algorithmic verification has seen success in es-
tablishing correctness of many hardware and software systems, and based
on recent developments, they present an attractive approach for verification
of embedded control systems. Consider the satellite example where we may
wish to determine, up to some bounded time, whether there could be a col-
lision with another object or satellite. If all reachable states of our satellite
can be calculated up to this time bound, then we can check if this reachable
set intersects an unsafe set that corresponds to a potential collision. The key
to this approach is being able to compute the set of reachable states.
Over the past two decades, there has been tremendous progress in devel-
oping algorithms and data-structures for solving the reachability problem for
hybrid models which involve both discrete and continuous dynamics [3, 4, 5,
6, 7, 8, 9]. There are several software tools [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15] which have
been effectively used to analyze complex control systems [16, 17, 18, 19, 20].
Yet, in a system with many interacting components, such as the embedded
control system in a car or a satellite, as the number of interacting compo-
nents increases, computing the reach set quickly becomes intractable. In this
thesis, we propose an approach that exploits the modular structure of the
models for efficient bounded safety verification.
1.1 Approach Overview
We consider systems built from simpler modules or components . Our ap-
proach is based on first approximating the influence of one component on an-
other using the reach set computations of the individual components. These
computations are relatively inexpensive because they involve components
with fewer continuous variables. We have developed an algorithm that suc-
cessively computes overapproximations of the overall system reach set using
the component reach sets while simultaneously doing checks for safety.
The verification algorithm relates the component reach sets through a
shared time variable. For a specified time interval, the algorithm creates
a conservative overapproximation of the composed system’s reach set using
the component reach sets. If the overapproximation is sufficient to make a
safety decision with respect to the unsafe set, then the algorithm stops. Oth-
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erwise, the original time interval is split into two smaller intervals, and safety
is checked recursively over these smaller intervals. The overapproximations
of the composed reach set become more accurate when created over shorter
time intervals.
In extreme cases, for example, in the system with two orbiting satellites,
the components (individual satellites) are only coupled through shared time
and the reach sets of the components can be computed directly. In general,
to compute the component reach sets independently where the subsystems
interact through shared variables, we have to somehow abstract the influence
of one component on another. For systems whose components are coupled via
shared variables without feedback loops, we overapproximate their interac-
tion to be able to compute the component reach sets separately. For any two
components in this coupled system there will be one component whose states’
evolution is a function of the input signal from the other component. We do
the overapproximation by first partitioning the time bound over which the
reach sets will be computed into a set of smaller intervals. For the dependent
automaton in the system we create an abstraction using this time partition.
Over each time interval of the partition in the abstraction, we use the reach
set of the non-dependent component to create upper and lower bounds on
the range of values the input signal can take over each time interval. We
establish a theoretical bound on the approximation error in this abstraction.
We have experimentally evaluated the performance of these approaches by
implementing the algorithms in prototype software tools and applying them
to several case studies. The feasibility of the abstraction for interacting
automata components is demonstrated through a set of case studies. Prelim-
inary experiments show that while improvement in the runtime and memory
usage is achieved in some test cases, the additional discrete locations intro-
duced by the abstraction can also negatively affect the computation costs in
others. These results suggest the need for a more careful implementation of
the time-partitioning algorithm and also a more rigorous performance analy-
sis of this approach with respect to the type of coupling. For loosely coupled
systems, algorithms presented in Chapter 3 showed clear improvements in
verifying collision avoidance of several 2-satellite systems over direct reach-
ability analysis; in some cases this algorithm beats direct reachability-based
algorithm by several (2-3) orders of magnitude.
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1.2 Related Work
There is a large and growing body of work on automatic safety verification of
cyber-physical systems modeled as different types of hybrid systems. Initially
several classes of hybrid systems were identified for which the exact reach-
ability problem is decidable. These classes include timed automata [21],
rectangular initialized hybrid automata [4, 3], o-minimal systems [5], and
STORMED systems [22]. As these classes have restricted expressive power,
subsequently, there has been more focus on practical algorithms and data
structures for approximating the reach sets of more general hybrid systems.
Several useful types of data-structures have been proposed including polyhe-
dra [23], zonotopes [24], ellipsoids [25] and semi-algebraic sets [26]. Approxi-
mate reachability algorithms based on these data-structures are embodied in
tools such as ddt [13], HyTech [10], Checkmate [27], PHAVer [11], and more
recently SpaceEx [28].
For nonlinear hybrid systems a standard approach is to use hybridization
where the state space for a nonlinear system is broken up into a partition
of different zones. Here, the nonlinear dynamics within each zone are over-
approximated with rectangular, linear, or affine dynamics [29, 30]. We use
this approach in Chapter 4 for the satellite case study where the nonlinear
dynamics are overapproximated with rectangular dynamics. Hybridization
also inspired the abstraction in Chapter 5 where the partitioning is over time
intervals instead of the state-space. An alternative approach for handling
nonlinear dynamics, that does not involve hybridization, has been presented
in [31].
Our approach for decomposition is similar in spirit to the work presented
in [32], in which the authors consider affine continuous dynamical systems
where subsystems can be separated using what is called an -decomposition
of the matrices defining the differential equations. The reachable states of
the subsystems are computed and used to calculate an overapproximation
of the composed system. Bounds on the approximation error are calculated
for the decomposed system which are then used in the conservative overap-
proximation of the composed reach set. The efficiency of the approach is
dependent on how strongly the subsystems are coupled. In [33], a decompo-
sitional approach is also proposed where they consider continuous linear time
invariant (LTI) dynamical systems. Given a LTI system, a series of trans-
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formations are used to decompose the system into unidirectionally weakly
coupled subsystems. Reachability can then be performed on the lower di-
mension subsystems. The level of conservatism in the reach set is dependent
on the how strongly the subsystems are coupled.
These methods differ in that they are exclusively concerned with the reach-
ability computation itself and apply to only linear and affine systems. In our
method, on the other hand, the unsafe set for a particular verification prob-
lem is used when computing reach set overapproximations of the composed
system. The approximations are computed selectively over only the relevant
durations of time that are necessary to make a decision about safety with
respect to the unsafe set.
1.3 Organization
First, Chapter 2 presents necessary background information and the hybrid
automaton model that is used throughout the thesis. Chapter 3 develops
the verification algorithms that verify safety properties using the component
reach sets of a decomposed system. Here, the components can only be cou-
pled through a shared time axis. In Chapter 4 we present a two-satellite
system case study where the verification algorithm is implemented. Then, in
Chapter 5 we develop an abstraction to extend the verification technique to
systems whose components are coupled through shared continuous variables.
The abstraction overapproximates the interactions between the components
such that the abstracted component reach sets can be computed indepen-
dently. The feasibility of this abstraction is demonstrated in Chapter 6 with
a numerical example. Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes the results and gives




2.1 Functions, Sets, and Variables
We will introduce the hybrid I/O automaton modeling framework, but first
we begin with some notation for functions and sets. For any function f we
write the domain and range of f as dom(f) and range(f). For a function
f and a set S ⊆ dom(f), we write the restriction of f to S as fdS. For a
function f whose range is a set of functions, we write f ↓ S for the function
g with dom(g) = dom(f) such that g(c) = f(c)dS ∀c ∈ dom(g).
A variable is a name used to identify state components of automata and
communication channels between automata. Each variable v is associated
with a type, type(v), which is the set of values v can take. A valuation for
a set of variables V , maps each v ∈ V with a value in type(v). For a set of
variables V , val(V ) denotes the set of all possible valuations of V . Valuations
are denoted by v,x,x′, etc. For a valuation v of V the value of a variable
v ∈ V , is denoted by v.v ∆= v d {v}.
For x ∈ Rn, γ ≥ 0, Bγ(x) ∆= {y : |y − x| ≤ γ} denotes the ball centered
at x of radius γ. The bounded and compact set S ⊆ Rn expanded by γ is




Bγ(x). Letting ∂S denote the boundary of S,
we define Shrink(S, γ)
∆
= {x : x ∈ S ∧ (min
y∈∂S
|y− x|) ≥ γ} as the set S shrunk
by γ.
A trajectory τ for V is a function τ : [0, t] → val(V ), where t ∈ R≥0.
That is, a trajectory maps an interval [0, t] of time to valuations of V . Ex-
ample trajectories are shown in Fig. 2.1. A variable is continuous if all its
trajectories are piecewise-continuous. A discrete variable is a special type
of continuous variable whose trajectories are piece-wise constant. We define
τ. fstate
∆
= τ(0) and τ. lstate
∆
= τ(t). Given a trajectory τ of V , the restriction
of the trajectory to a variable v ∈ V is denoted by τ ↓ v. The concatenation
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Figure 2.1: Example trajectories for some real-valued continuous variable x.
of two trajectories τ1, τ2 is done by taking the union between the first trajec-
tory and the second where the second trajectory has its domain shifted by
the limit time of the first as follows: τ1 _ τ2
∆
= τ1 ∪ (τ2d(0,∞) + τ1. ltime).
A hybrid sequence is used to model a combination of instantaneous
changes and changes that evolve continuously over a period of time. Using a
set of actions A to model the instantaneous changes, an (A, V )−sequence is
an alternating sequence α = τ0a1τ1a2τ2... where V is a set of variables, each
τi is a trajectory of the variables in V , and each ai ∈ A.
2.2 Hybrid I/O Automata
The following definition of hybrid I/O automata makes a few minor changes
to the standard one [34, 35] for a cleaner presentation of the results in this
paper.
Definition 1. The hybrid I/O automaton (HIOA) is a tuple A ∆= 〈V, L,Θ, A,D, T 〉,
where:
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(a) V is a set of variables. V consists of a single discrete variable loc of
type L, and sets of (continuous) internal (X), input (U), and output
(Y ) variables. The set Q
∆
= val({loc} ∪X) is called the set of states.
(b) Θ ⊆ Q is a set of initial states.
(c) A is a set of (internal) transition labels.
(d) D ⊆ Q × A × Q is a set of discrete state transitions. For a transition
((`,x), a, (`′,x′)) ∈ D we write (`,x) a→A (`′,x′) in short and drop the
suffix A when the automaton is clear from context.
(e) T : Set of trajectories for V that is closed under prefix, suffix, and con-
catenation (see [34, 35] for details).
In addition, a HIOA must satisfy the input enabled condition: For any state
(`,x) ∈ Q and any time-bounded trajectory ν of U , there exists τ with
τ. fstate = (`,x) such that either (a) (τ ↓ U) = ν or (b) (τ ↓ U) is a
prefix of ν and some discrete transition is enabled at τ. lstate.
Typically D is syntactically specified by guards and reset maps for each
a ∈ A. For any a ∈ A, Grd(a) ∆= {(`,x) | ∃ (`′,x′) such that (`,x) a→ (`′,x′)}.
We define the set-valued function Rst(a) which maps each (`,x) ∈ Grd(a)
to the set {(`′,x′) | such that (`,x) a→ (`′,x′)}. Typically T is syntacti-
cally specified by invariants, stopping conditions, and differential equations.
For each ` ∈ L, the corresponding invariant Inv(`) and stopping condition
Stop(`) are subsets of Q, and Flow(`) is a set of differential and algebraic
equations (or inequalities) involving the continuous variables X ∪ U ∪ Y . A
trajectory τ for V is in the set T` iff (a) (τ ↓ loc)(0) = `, (b) τ ↓ V is a solu-
tion of flow(`) for the given trajectory (τ ↓ U) of the input variables, (c) For
any t ∈ dom(τ), (τ ↓ {loc ∪X})(t) ∈ Inv(`), and (d) For any t ∈ dom(τ), if
(τ ↓ {loc∪X})(t) ∈ Stop(`) then t = τ. ltime. The set of trajectories T is the
union ∪`∈LT`. See [35] for details and examples. For a variable x ∈ X, u ∈ U ,
the differential equation x˙ = f(x, u) specified trajectories which are solutions
of this equation for any trajectory of u. For an automaton A, we refer to the
components of the automaton as VA, XA, QA,ΘA, AA etc. For automaton
Ai, the components will be denoted by Vi, Xi, Qi,Θi, etc.
Next, we define the parallel composition operation on HIOAs which is used
for constructing larger models from two interacting models. In this paper, we
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consider HIOA-components that only interact through shared input/output
variables1
Definition 2. Hybrid automata A1 and A2 are compatible if X1 ∩ V2 =
X2 ∩ V1 = ∅. If A1 and A2 are compatible, then their composition A1‖A2 is
defined as A ∆= 〈V, L,Θ, A,D, T 〉, where:
(a) X = X1 ∪X2, Y = Y1 ∪ Y2, U = U1 ∪ U2 \ (Y1 ∪ Y2), and V = {loc} ∪
X ∪ Y ∪U , where loc has type L = L1×L2. We denote the first and the
second components of a ` ∈ L by `1 and `2.
(b) Θ = {(`,x) ∈ Q|(`1,xdX1) ∈ Θ1 ∧ (`2,xdX2) ∈ Θ2}.
(c) A = A1 ∪ A2.
(d) D ⊂ Q × A × Q For each x,x′ ∈ Q and each a ∈ A, x a→A x′ iff
for i = 1, 2, either (1) a ∈ Ai and xdXi a→i x′dXi or (2) a /∈ Ai and
xdXi = x′dXi.
(e) T ⊂ trajs(V ) is defined by τ ∈ T ↔ (τ ↓ Vi) ∈ Ti, i ∈ {1, 2}.
2.3 Executions, Reach Sets, and Safety
An execution fragment α of automatonA is a (A, V )-sequence α = τ0a1τ1a2...,
where each τi ∈ T , ai ∈ A, and τi−1. lstate ai→ τi. fstate. The first state of α,
α. fstate is denoted by τ0. fstate. If α is a finite sequence ending with a closed
trajectory τn, then its last state α. lstate is defined as τn. lstate and its du-
ration α. ltime is defined as
∑n
i=0 τ. ltime. Along execution α, A’s state may
not be uniquely defined at a given time t ∈ [0, α. ltime]: one or more discrete
transitions occur at time t. We adopt the convention that the state at time
t is the unique state after all possible transitions at time t. Formally, for
any time t ∈ [0, α. ltime], we define the state of A at time t, denoted by
α(t), as α′. lstate where α′ is the longest prefix of α with α′. ltime ≤ t. An
execution fragment is an execution if it also starts at an initial state, that is,
α. fstate ∈ Θ. The set of all executions and execution fragments are denoted
by ExecsA and FragsA. The set of executions and execution fragments up to
time T are denoted ExecsTA and Frags
T
A.
1This is our HIOA definition has only internal transitions.
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Figure 2.2: Bouncing ball example execution.
An example execution from a bouncing ball automaton is shown in Fig. 2.2.
The position x and velocity v evolve according to the differential equations
d
dt
(x) = v and d
dt
(v) = −g where g is the acceleration due to gravity. Each
bounce is modeled as discrete jump. The guard for the bounce transition
is {x = 0 ∧ v < 0}, and the resets are x′ = x and v′ = −ρ ∗ v. Here, ρ is
a scaling factor that models the energy dissipation from each bounce, and
0 < ρ < 1.
A state (`,x) is reachable if there exists an execution α with α. lstate =
(`,x). Define ReachA(t1, t2) as (`,x) ∈ ReachA(t1, t2) iff there exists an ex-
ecution α ∈ ExecsA and a time t ∈ [t1, t2] such that α(t) = x. We write
ReachA(t, t) simply as ReachA(t) and ReachA(0, T ) as Reach
T
A. Given a set of
states U ⊆ Q, A is said to be T -safe with respect to U if ReachTA and U are
disjoint. It is said to be safe if it is T -safe for all T . Otherwise it is said to
be unsafe.
Several special classes of hybrid automata have been identified for which
ReachA and Reach
T
A can be computed exactly [21, 36, 5, 22]. For general
10
automata with complex continuous dynamics, exact computation is unde-
cidable and one has to rely on overapproximations for safety verification.
Over the past decade, several algorithms and tools have been developed for
computing overapproximations of bounded reach sets of different classes of
hybrid automata. Examples include tools such as HyTech [10], UPPAAL [12],
PHAVer [11], and the more recent SpaceEx [28]. In this paper, we will make
use of these reach set overapproximations. Overapproximations of ReachA
and ReachTA will be denoted by ReachA and Reach
T
A. Thus, for a state
(`,x) ∈ ReachTA, it is not guaranteed that there exists an execution of A
that actually reaches (`,x) within time T . We introduce cartesian products
of reach set overapproximations that will be used in the subsequent chapters.
Definition 3. Let A1,A2, ...,An be a collection of HIOAs. For a [t1, t2]
interval, we define the following composition overapproximations:






Ci(t1, t2) can be computed by taking the convex hull of ReachAi(t1, t2).
2.4 Hiding Variables and Traces
An execution records information about all variables and transitions over a
particular run of the system. Sometimes it is useful to consider the infor-
mation about only a subset of variables and transitions. Formally, this is
achieved by restricting the execution. For any A′ ⊆ A and V ′ ⊆ V , the
(A′, V ′)-restriction of an execution α = τ0a1τ1 . . . τn is an (A′, V ′)-sequence β
which is defined in two steps as follows: (1) Each ai /∈ A′ is removed from
α. (2) All consecutive trajectories τiτi+1 are replaced by a single concate-
nated trajectory τi
_ τi+1. (3) Each τi is replaced by τi ↓ Vi. The resulting




1 . . . τ
′
n is a (A
′, V ′)-sequence.
Lastly, in Chapter 5 we will be analyzing HIOA that interact via shared
variables where the following definition will be necessary.
Definition 4. Consider two HIOA automata A1 and A2. A1 has a variable
dependency on A2 if ∃ x ∈ X1 of A1, and ∃y ∈ Y2, where y is mapped to an




In this chapter we present an algorithm for safety verification of a class
of non-interacting HIOAs. The complete system is a HIOA A which is a
composition A = A0‖ . . . ‖An−1, but none of the component automata have
any input variables. The only coupling between these automata is the shared
notion of time. Automata compositions with variable dependencies will be
considered in Chapter 5. Safety is determined with respect to some unsafe
set U defined by valuations of the continuous variables of the component
automata. Recall that, for any time bound T ≥ 0, A is T -safe with respect
to U iff U∩ReachTA = ∅. We will not compute Reach
T
A directly, but instead, we
will use the reach sets of the component automata. Let the automata Ai, i ∈
[n] be augmented with a continuous timer variable. This timer variable will
be used to relate component reach sets. For some [tmin, tmax] ⊆ [0, T ], the
component reach sets will be combined according to Definition 3 to create
convex polyhedra that overapproximate the reach set of A over that interval.
3.1 Bounded Safety with Approximate Reach Sets
The verification process is implemented through Verify1 (shown in Algo-
rithm 1) and its subroutine ReachCompCheck1 (Algorithm 2). In Verify1,
two global safety flags, UnsafeFlag and UndecidedFlag, are initialized to false
but can be modified in the subroutine. These flags are used to determine
the safety of the entire system. ReachCompCheck1 uses a parameter  > 0
and Reach
T
Ai for each i ∈ [n]. Each call to ReachCompCheck1 computes an
overapproximation C(t1, t2) of the reach set of A over a time interval [t1, t2]
by taking the Cartesian product of the convex hull of the ReachAi(t1, t2)’s. A
call to ReachCompCheck1 can lead to four possible cases. First, if C(t1, t2)
is disjoint from U then the global safety flags remain unchanged. Second,
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if C(t1, t2) is contained in U then UnsafeFlag is set to true . Otherwise,
ReachCompCheck1 is called recursively over two smaller time intervals that
equally divide [t1, t2], unless the duration of the interval t2 − t1 is already
shorter  in which case UndecidedFlag is set to true .
Algorithm 1 Verify1(T,A,U , )
1: ∀i ∈ [1, ..., n] compute ReachTAi
2: UnsafeFlag = false
3: UndecidedFlag = false
4: ReachCompCheck1(0, T )
5: if UnsafeFlag then
6: return UNSAFE





Algorithm 2 ReachCompCheck1(tmin, tmax)
1: ∀i ∈ [1, ..., n]
2: Ci(x, tmin, tmax) ← convexhull(ReachAi(tmin, tmax))
3: if U ∩ C(tmin, tmax) = ∅ then
4: return
5: else if C(tmin, tmax) ⊆ U then
6: UnsafeFlag = true
7: return
8: else if (tmax − tmin) <  then
9: UndecidedFlag = true
10: return
11: else









Termination of Verify1 is obvious: for an initial call to ReachCompCheck1
over the interval [0, T ], the depth of the recursive call tree is at most log T

.
When a particular call terminates without making additional recursive calls
its denoted as a leaf node of the call tree.
If all the leaves’ C(tmin, tmax)s do not intersect U then Verify1 decides
SAFE, if one of the leaves’ C(tmin, tmax) is contained in U then the verification
algorithm decides UNSAFE, otherwise it returns UNDECIDED.
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A run of Verify1 is demonstrated in Fig. 3.1 for the two-satellite system
that is discussed in detail in Chapter 4. The system is modeled by two
automata, each having a continuous timer variable and an angular position
variable θ. Shown in the figure are the angular positions of the two satellites.
The actual reach set of the composed system is not shown, but it starts from
(0.25, 0), travels to the upper right of the state space, and is contained within
the blue set. The unsafe set is represented by two small polyhedra that are
highlighted by the red circles. The numbers indicate the compositions that
are calculated as rectangles for the first four levels of the call tree that was
executed (deeper levels of the call tree are not labeled). In the first call to
the subroutine ReachCompCheck1, the single lightest gray box labeled “1” is
computed. In this figure it is overlapped by other compositions in subsequent
calls to ReachCompCheck1. Here, there is a nonempty intersection with the
unsafe set, but the intersection is not contained within the unsafe set, so
ReachCompCheck1 is called recursively. The time interval is split and the
two compositions at the next depth in the call tree are labeled “2”. Once
a call is made with a composition that has an empty intersection with the
unsafe set, it is a terminating call and is colored blue. The process continues
with recursive calls to ReachCompCheck1 until, in this case, none of the
terminating compositions intersect the unsafe set, and Verify1 can return
SAFE.
The following assumption about the reach set computations will be used
in establishing Proposition 1. It states that for any  > 0, there exists a
bound γ such that the composite overapproximation of the reach set over an
interval of length  is contained in the actual computed reach set bloated by
γ.
Assumption 3.1.1. For any  > 0, T > 0 there exits a γ > 0 such that for
all t ∈ [0, T − ], C(t, t+ ) ⊆ Expand(ReachA(t, t+ ), γ).
The following proposition asserts the correctness of Verify1 for bounded
safety verification. If it returns SAFE, then the T -bounded reach set does
not intersect the unsafe set. If the γ bloated reach set does not intersect the
unsafe set, then the algorithm will return SAFE. If UNSAFE is returned,
then there exists a time interval greater than or equal to 
2
such that the
reach set over that interval is contained in the unsafe set. If there exists a
time interval greater than or equal to 2 such that the γ bloated reach set over
14






















Figure 3.1: Compositions from a run of Verify1 which decided safe. The
gray boxes represent compositions which had non-empty intersections with
U , but were not contained in U , thus Verify1 was called recursively. The
darker the shade the deeper the call to Verify1 in the call tree. The blue set
represents the compositions of the terminating calls of Verify1, which did
not intersect U . The unsafe set U is highlighted by the red circles.
Parameters: e1 = 0.328, a1 = 19025km, e2 = 0.324, a2 = 20184,
partitionsize = 20deg,T = 0.85 orbits, d = 100km, init: (0.25, 0).
that interval is contained in the unsafe set, then the algorithm will decide
UNSAFE. If Verify1 returns UNDECIDED, then the γ bloated reach set has
a nonempty intersection with the unsafe set, but for any 2 time interval, the
γ bloated reach set over that interval is not a subset of the unsafe set. If the
reach set has non empty intersection with the unsafe set and for any 
2
time
interval the reach set over that interval is not a subset of the unsafe set, then
Verify1 will return UNDECIDED.
Proposition 1. For any time bound T ≥ 0, and parameter value  > 0, there
exists a γ such that the decision made by Verify1 is related to the computed
reach set of A as follows:
15
(A0) SAFE ⇒ ReachTA ∩ U = ∅.
(A1) Expand(Reach
T
A, γ) ∩ U = ∅ ⇒ SAFE.
(B0) UNSAFE ⇒ ∃ t, t′ ∈ [0, T ] with t′ − t ≥ 
2
, ReachA(t, t
′) ⊆ U .
(B1) ∃ t, t′ ∈ [0, T ] with t′ − t ≥ 2, such that Expand(ReachA(t′, t), γ) ⊂ U
⇒ UNSAFE.
(C0) UNDECIDED⇒ Expand(ReachTA, γ)∩U 6= ∅ ∧ ∀t Expand(ReachA(t, t+
2), γ) 6⊆ U .
(C1) Reach
T
A ∩ U 6= ∅ ∧ ∀t ReachA(t, t+ 2) 6⊆ U ⇒ UNDECIDED.
Proof. We fix  and T . Let Λ = {[t0, t1], [t1, t2], ..., [tk, tk+1]} be the set of
intervals corresponding to the leaves of the final call tree. Since the interval
at each recursive call is split into two, it follows that
⋃
σ∈Λ = [0, T ].
(A0) If the verification algorithm decides SAFE then for each leaf node σ ∈ Λ,
the corresponding C(σ) ∩ U = ∅. From Definition 3 we know that for any







A ∩ U = ∅.
(A1) If Expand(Reach
T
A, γ) ∩ U = ∅ then ∀ t ∈ [0, T − ] the composition
C(t, t + ) ∩ U = ∅ by Assumption 3.1.1. Thus, for all σ ∈ Λ, C(σ) ∩ U = ∅
and the algorithm returns SAFE.
(B0) If the algorithm decides UNSAFE then ∃σ ∈ Λ such that C(σ) ⊂ U .
Since ReachA(σ) ⊂ C(σ), ReachA(σ) ⊂ U .
(B1) If there exists t1, t2 ∈ [0, T ], where t2 − t1 ≥ 2, such that
Expand(ReachA(t1, t2), γ) ⊂ U , then ∀tmin, tmax where 2 ≤ tmax − tmin ≤ 
and t1 ≤ tmin < tmax ≤ t2, C(tmin, tmax) ⊆ U by Assumption 3.1.1. The
requirement t2 − t1 ≥ 2 is necessary since the time partitioning can take
place any where along the interval t1 to t2. Therefore, there will be at least
one σ ∈ Λ such that C(σ) ⊆ U and this σ will lead the algorithm to decide
UNSAFE.
(C0) If Verify1 terminates with UNDECIDED then we know, first, that for
some leaf σ ∈ Λ UndecidedFlag was set to true. That is, C(σ)∩U 6= ∅, where
the duration of the interval σ is between 
2
and . From Assumption 3.1.1,
C(σ) ⊆ Expand(ReachA(σ), γ) and Expand(ReachA(σ), γ) ∩ U 6= ∅. Secondly,
none of the leaves set UnsafeFlag to false, that is, for any σ ∈ Λ C(σ)∩U 6⊆
U . For each σ there are then two possibilities.
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(a) First, σ could be safe such that C(σ)∩U = ∅. Since ReachA(σ) ⊆ C(σ),
ReachA(σ) ∩ U = ∅. Then, ∀t1, t2 ∈ σ, Expand(ReachA(t1, t2), γ) 6⊆ U .
(b) Or, σ could set UndecidedFlag to true implying that the duration of
σ is bounded by 
2
and  and C(σ) 6⊆ U . Using Assumption 3.1.1,
Expand(ReachA(σ), γ) 6⊆ U .
Therefore, either any [t, t + 2] time interval intersects a safe time inter-
val [t1, t2] where [t1, t2] ⊆ [t, t + 2] and Expand(ReachA(t1, t2), γ) 6⊆ U , or
[t, t + 2] contains a σ interval that set UndecidedFlag to true such that
Expand(ReachA(σ), γ) 6⊆ U .
(C1) If Reach
T
A ∩ U 6= ∅, then there exists a σ ∈ Λ, such that C(σ) ∩ U 6= ∅
and σ did not return SAFE. If ∀t ReachA(t, t+ 2) 6⊆ U , then ∀t C(t, t+ 2) 6⊆ U
and thus any σ does not return UNSAFE. The first statement also implies
that there exists a leaf that returned UNDECIDED.
Algorithm 3 Verify2(T,A,U , )
1: ∀i ∈ [1, ..., n] compute ReachTAi
2: UnsafeFlag = false
3: PossiblyUnsafeFlag = false
4: UndecidedFlag = false
5: ReachCompCheck2(0, T )
6: if UnsafeFlag then
7: return UNSAFE
8: else if PossiblyUnsafeFlag then
9: return POSSIBLY UNSAFE





3.2 Bounded Safety with Exact Reach Sets
In this section we consider a refinement for the previous algorithm which
relies on exact bounded reach set computations. Several classes of HA have
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Algorithm 4 ReachCompCheck2(tmin, tmax)
1: ∀i ∈ [1, ..., n]
2: Ci(x, tmin, tmax) ← convexhull(ReachAi(tmin, tmax))
3: if U ∩ C(tmin, tmax) = ∅ then
4: return
5: else if C(tmin, tmax) ⊆ U then
6: UnsafeFlag = true
7: return
8: else if (tmax − tmin) <  then
9: if Shrink(U , γ) ∩ C(tmin, tmax) 6= ∅ then
10: PossiblyUnsafeFlag = true
11: return
12: else













been identified in the literature which fit this requirement (see for exam-
ple [21, 36, 5, 22]). If ReachTA can be computed exactly, then ReachCom-
pCheck1 can be augmented with an additional check to gain more information
from the UNDECIDED case. The augmented algorithms, Verify2 (shown in
Algorithm 3) and ReachCompCheck2 (Algorithm 4), use a new global vari-
able called PossiblyUnsafeFlag, where Verify2 can now return POSSIBLY
UNSAFE in addition to the original safety decisions. In the previous algo-
rithms where overapproximated reach sets were used, if Reach
T
A was never
contained in the unsafe set for some time interval but still intersected it,
then we could not say that at least one execution of the real system entered
the unsafe set. Now, with exact reach sets, we can distinguish between the
undecided case and the possibly unsafe case where at least one execution of
the real system enters the unsafe set.
The semantics of the SAFE and UNSAFE decisions remain unchanged. If
all the leaves’ C(σ)s are not contained in U , but for one leaf σ C(σ) intersects
Shrink(U , γ), then Verify2 decides POSSIBLY UNSAFE. If none the leaves’
C(σ)s are contained in U , but for one leaf σ C(σ) has a nonempty intersect
with U and an empty intersection with Shrink(U , γ), then UNDECIDED is
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returned.
If Verify2 returns POSSIBLY UNSAFE, then for all 2 time intervals the γ
bloated reach set over that interval is not contained in the unsafe set, but the
reach set intersects the unsafe set. If for all 
2
time intervals, the reach set over
that interval is not contained in the unsafe set and the reach set intersects the
unsafe set shrunk by γ, then the algorithm will decide POSSIBLY UNSAFE.
If UNDECIDED is returned then for all 2 time intervals, the γ bloated reach
set over those intervals is not contained in the unsafe set and reach set does
not intersect the unsafe set shrunk by γ.
There are no conditions on the reach set that will guarantee UNDECIDED
is chosen. When undecided is chosen, there exists a C(σ) that has a non-
empty intersection with U , but has an empty intersection with Shrink(U , γ).
Here, the actual reach set may or may not intersect the unsafe set. It is
not suffient to say ReachTA ∩ U 6= ∅ ∧ ReachTA ∩ Shrink(U , γ) = ∅ to guaran-
tee undecided. In this situation, there could still be a C(σ) that intersects
Shrink(U , γ).
Proposition 2. For any time bound T ≥ 0, and parameter value  > 0, there
exists a γ such that the POSSIBLY UNSAFE and UNDECIDED decisions
made by Verify2 is related to the computed reach set of A as follows:
(A0) POSSIBLY UNSAFE⇒ ∀ t Expand(ReachA(t, t+2), γ) 6⊆ U ∧ReachTA∩
U 6= ∅.
(A1) ∀ t ReachA(t, t + 2) 6⊆ U ∧ ReachTA ∩ Shrink(U , γ) 6= ∅ ⇒ POSSIBLY
UNSAFE.
(B) UNDECIDED ⇒ ∀ t Expand(ReachA(t, t + 2), γ) 6⊆ U ∧ ReachTA ∩
Shrink(U , γ) = ∅.
Proof. (A0) If Verify2 terminates POSSIBLY UNSAFE, then ∃σ that set Pos-
siblyUnsafeFlag to true where σ is bounded between 
2
and  such that C(σ)
∩ Shrink(U , γ) 6= ∅. Using Assumption 3.1.1, C(σ) ⊆ Expand(ReachA(σ), γ)
and Expand(ReachA(σ), γ) ∩ Shrink(U , γ) 6= ∅. This implies ReachA(σ) ∩
U 6= ∅.
Also, for all the leaves σ UnsafeFlag was not set to true, so we can
use the proof from part (C0) of the proof of Proposition 1 to show ∀ t
Expand(ReachA(t, t+ 2), γ).
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(A1) If ∀ t, ReachA(t, t + 2) 6⊆ U , then ∀σ, C(σ) 6⊆ U and σ does not set
UnsafeFlag to true. If ReachTA ∩ Shrink(U , γ) 6= ∅, then ∃σ where C(σ) ∩
Shrink(U , γ) 6= ∅ such that PossiblyUnsafeFlag is set to true and Verify2 will
return POSSIBLY UNSAFE.
(B) Since UNDECIDED, ∀σ UnsafeFlag was not set to true. The proof is the
same as in part (C0) of the proof of Proposition 1 to show ∀t Expand(ReachA(t, t+
2), γ) 6⊆ U . Also, ∀σ PossiblyUnsafeFlag was not set to true. So for all σ,
C(σ) ∩ Shrink(U , γ) = ∅, and ReachTA ⊆
⋃
∀σ C(σ).
In this chapter we presented a verification algorithm that checks safety
properties for systems that are composed of non-interacting HA components.
Two versions of the algorithm were presented depending on whether approx-
imate or exact reach sets can be computed. With exact reach sets, more
information can be determined from the undecided case to differentiate be-
tween UNDECIDED and POSSIBLY UNSAFE. Here, POSSIBLY UNSAFE





In this chapter, we present experimental results on safety verification of a
two-satellite system, using the techniques of Chapter 3. For modern satellite
systems with significant autonomous capabilities, uncertainties in the model
arise from various sources such as uncertain orbit parameters, uncertain ini-
tial conditions, or sensor errors. Formal verification techniques can establish
safety while accounting for such uncertainties, making them attractive anal-
ysis tools. It is also the case that satellite positions are observed periodically
from Earth-based stations to confirm their location, and therefore, bounded
time safety verification is often sufficient.
We will verify the following property: conjunction avoidance: given
two passive (non-thrusting) satellites, they do not come closer than a certain
distance within the time horizon T . The satellites can be modeled as Hybrid
Automaton A1, A2 where the composition is A = A1‖A2. We will compare
two methods for verifying conjunction avoidance: first, by directly computing





using Algorithm 1. The results from the first method have been reported
in [19].
4.1 Astrodynamics Background
A satellite is an object moving around the Earth under the influence of the
latter’s gravitational force. By Kepler’s first law, the orbit of a satellite is
an ellipse with the Earth at one of the foci, called the main focus , and thus
the satellite remains in the same plane in 3-dimensional space.1 Different
orbits may or may not be coplanar or coaxial. The masses of the Earth and
1Generally, an orbit is some conic section, but we assume orbits are circular or elliptical (the eccentricity







Figure 4.1: Two non-coaxial satellite orbits: θ1 and θ2 are the satellite
angular positions, a is the semi-major axis, p is the semi-latus rectum, φ is
the angular offset between the satellite axes, and F is the common foci the
satellites are orbiting around.
the satellite, and the velocity of the satellite (with respect to Earth) at a
particular position in space, uniquely define the orbit it is on.








(1 + e cos θ)2, (4.1)
where θ is the angle of the satellite with respect to the major axis as measured
from the main focus (known as the true anomaly), e is the eccentricity,
p = a(1−e2) is called the semi-latus rectum, a is the semi-major axis , and µ is
the geocentric gravitational parameter. See Fig. 4.1 for a graphical depiction
of these quantities. This equation essentially captures Kepler’s law of equal
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areas. We refer the interested reader to standard texts in astrodynamics
(for example [37, 38, 39]) for derivations of this equation. Given an angle θ,
Cartesian coordinates of the satellite are specified by
r =
p
1 + e cos θ
, x = r cos θ, and y = r sin θ. (4.2)
The conjunction avoidance property is defined in terms of the proximity
of the two satellites measured by their Euclidean distance in 3-dimensional
space. Given two orbits o1, o2, and a distance threshold d, we define the
set Pd(o1, o2) ⊆ R2 to be all (θ1, θ2) values at which the distance between
the orbits is at most d. For verifying conjunction avoidance the unsafe set
U = Pd(o1, o2). For coplanar orbits,
Pd(o1, o2)
∆
= {(θ1, θ2) : ||(x1, y1)− (x2, y2)|| ≤ d} (4.3)
where ||·|| is the 2-norm. For non-coaxial and non-coplanar orbit pairs, the
expression for Pd(o1, o2) is analogous, albeit more complex.
2 Although (4.1)
models the angular positions θ1 and θ2 as unbounded quantities, with respect
to the distance predicate Pd, it suffices to look at θ1 mod 2pi and θ2 mod 2pi.
Therefore, in constructing the hybrid automaton model of the satellite we
model the angular positions as continuous variables of type [0, 2pi] and add
the appropriate wrap-around transitions.
4.2 Hybridization
Since the software tools for computing the reach set of nonlinear systems are
not as well-developed as those for linear and rectangular HA, we abstract
the given nonlinear system by a HA with simpler dynamics. We employ the
hybridization approach developed in [29, 30]. The key idea is to partition
the state space [0, 2pi] into a finite number of zones and then conservatively
approximate the nonlinear dynamics in each zone with simpler dynamics. In
our case we use rectangular dynamics. The HA model of a single satellite is
2Non-coaxial orbits are shown in Fig. 4.1 and are used in the experiments. Non-coplanar orbits require
the introduction of more orbital parameters, but we note that all the methods presented in this chapter
apply for non-coaxial and non-coplanar orbits as well.
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constructed as follows.
Definition 5. Given a sequence of points 0 < r1 < . . . < rk−1 < 2pi
spanning the [0, 2pi] state space the resulting satellite HIOA is a tuple A
∆
= 〈V, L,Θ, A,D, T 〉, where:
(a) V is the set of variables. X = {θ, timer} and the set of discrete locations
L = {l1 . . . lk}. There are no input or output variables, i.e., U = Y = ∅.
(b) Θ ⊆ Q.
(c) A = {next}.
(d) (x, `)
next→ (x′, `′) iff one of the following conditions hold:
(i) x d θ = x′ d θ = rj for some partition point rj, and ` = lj, `′ = lj+1,
and x d timer = x′ d timer.
(ii) x d θ = 2pi, x′ d θ = 0 and ` = lk, `′ = l1, and x d timer = x′ d
timer.
(e) T is a set of trajectories for X specified by invariants, stopping condi-














(ii) Inv(`) = [r`−1, r`]
(iii) Stop(`) = (θ ≥ r`)
The complete two-satellite system is then the composition A = A1||A2.
4.3 Experimental Results
The implementation of the verification process has three parts: (i) A hy-
bridizer which generates the HA model for the satellites using procedure
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of Definition 5, (ii) A reachability tool PHAVer [11] which computes the
bounded reach sets of the HA produced by (i), (iii) A verifier which imple-
ments Algorithm 1 for checking conjunction avoidance. For direct verifica-
tion (monolithic), a single automaton modelling two satellites is verified with
PHAVer directly after hybridization. The reach set output from step (ii) is
represented as a collection of convex polyhedra. Our implementation of Al-
gorithm 1 analyzes this output using the functions provided in the Parma
Polyhedra Library (PPL) [23].
The first set of experiments compared two different methods of safety ver-
ification for the satellites. The monolithic method computes ReachTA for the
composite system and then checks the intersection of the reach set with
the unsafe distant set U . There are only two safety decisions for this ap-
proach, namely, SAFE or M-UNSAFE. If SAFE, then the intersection be-
tween ReachTA and U is empty. If M-UNSAFE, then the intersection is non-
empty. Unlike the algorithms presented in the previous chapter, in this
approach there are no checks to see if the reach set over a particular time in-
terval is a subset of the unsafe set. The compositional method first computes
ReachT1 and Reach
T
2 . Then, since the satellite HA definition is an abstrac-
tion of the actual non-linear system, we use Verify1 to check safety where
the safety decisions are SAFE, UNSAFE, or UNDECIDED. The semantics of
these safety decisions were outlined in Proposition 1. As an example of an ex-
periment that decided SAFE for both monolithic method and compositional
method, refer to Fig. 4.2 and Fig. 4.3.
The results of the comparison between these two methods are shown in
Table 4.1. The experiments were run on a laptop computer with an Intel
i5 processor running a Virtual Machine with Fedora that was allocated 2GB
of memory. Each test case in the table has two sub-rows—an M denotes
the monolithic approach and a C denotes the compositional approach. We
highlight the key observations from these experiments.
Savings in Reachability Computations For the compositional tests,
the relative run-time between the reachability computations and Verify1 were
comparable. In the monolithic test cases the majority of the run-time for the
verification procedure is in the PHAVer run time for generating the reach
sets. In the monolithic tests the total run-time is mostly in the reachability
computation where the PHAVer runtime is typically around three orders of
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Figure 4.2: From Table 4.1, test case nine where both the monolithic
method and compositional method decided safe. Green set is monolithic
reach set. For a run of Verify1, the blue set is
⋃
σ∈ΛC(σ). The red set is U ,
located near (.25, 4.3) and (4.64, 2.54).
magnitude greater than that for the compositional method. In addition, the
peak memory usage in PHAVer is around two to three orders of magnitude
greater in the monolithic method. These run-time and memory costs are not
that surprising because the composed system has three continuous variables
while each component automaton has only two. Also, for the individual
automata, which may have n discrete locations, the composition used to
create the single two satellite automaton has n2 discrete locations.
Hybridization Precision Test cases three through seven illustrate how
verification scales with more precise hybridization. Across these test cases,
the orbital parameters, initial condition, and time bound all remain the same,
only the hybridization partition size is varied from 30 degrees down to 5
degrees. The relative savings in computation costs between the two methods
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Figure 4.3: Zoomed in region from Fig. 4.2. Green set is monolithic reach
set. Blue set is
⋃
σ∈ΛC(σ), and red set is U .
becomes greater the smaller the partition size, showing how the algorithm
scales. For these test cases, Fig. 4.4 compares the computation costs between
the monolithic and compositional methods.
Shape of Orbits For test cases twelve through fourteen, the computation
costs are greater compared to other tests with the same time bound and
partition size. This is because these orbits have higher eccentricities which
in turn create larger rectangular inclusions in hybridization and larger reach
sets with many more polyhedra.
Now, consider the test cases in Table 4.2 which only use the compositional
approach with Verify1. These tests use finer partitions in hybridization and
produce composed automata which cannot be handled by the monolithic
approach. For these smaller partitions, the reach set compositions used in
Verify1 are more exact, and it is possible to decide UNSAFE as in Fig. 4.5.
Overall, the runtime of these experiments with the smaller partition sizes
were significantly higher.
27





































Figure 4.4: Computation costs comparing the monolithic method and the
compositional method. Plots are logarithmic, comparing the peak PHAVer
memory usage in the top plot and the PHAVer runtimes on the bottom.
Considering test cases seven through nine, the orbit parameters, initial
conditions, and time bound all remain the same. The partition size is pro-
gressively halved going from 0.1 to 0.05 to 0.025 degrees. The smaller par-
tition resolution allows for more accurate safety decisions to be made, but
towards these smaller partition sizes, the computation costs start to become
significant in both run time and memory.
In summary, these case studies have shown the effectiveness of using the
techniques presented in Chapter 3 for verifying systems loosely coupled through
a shared time axis. The satellite systems analyzed here had parameters de-
scribing realistic orbits that were verified (in some cases in seconds) for useful
durations of time using off the shelf hardware. For example, for a duration of
six orbits with one degree partitions, the conjunction avoidance property was
established in 41 seconds. Depending on the desired accuracy of the overap-
proximated reach set, these techniques could be used in real-time verification
28










Figure 4.5: From Table 4.2, zoomed in portion of test case seven which
decided unsafe. For the run of Verify1, the blue set is
⋃
σ∈ΛC(σ). Several





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In this chapter we show how bounded reach sets of feed-forward networks of
HIOAs can be computed by abstracting the continuous interactions. Con-
sider a pair of automata A1,A2 in a feed-forward chain. Say, the output u
from A1 affects the evolution of A2’s state variable x. First, the effect of u
on x’s evolution is overapproximated by creating an abstraction B of A2 in
the context of A1. By construction, A1 and B are coupled only by the shared
time. Then, Algorithm 1 can be used as before to determine global safety
properties of the composed system.
5.1 Abstraction Definition
Definition 6. Given HIOA A1 and A2 where A2 has a variable dependency
on A1, a time bound T , and a sequence Γ of n− 1 time points 0 < t1 < t2 <
. . . < tn − 1 < T , the hybrid I/O automaton (HIOA) abstraction of A2 is a
tuple B ∆= 〈V ′, L′,Θ′, A′,D′, T ′〉.
(a) V ′ ∆= X ′ ∪ Y ′ ∪ U ′, where X ′ = X2 ∪ {timer}, Y ′ = Y2, U ′ = U2; timer
is a real-valued continuous variable.
(b) L′ ∆= L2 × [n],
(c) Θ′ ∆= {(s, t)|s ∈ Θ, timer = 0},




(l′,x′)) iff one of the following conditions hold:




(ii) a = tick and x.timer = tk, for some time point, l
′[2] = l[2] + 1 and
x d X2 = x′ d X2.
(f) T ′ is a set of trajectories for XB: For any τ ′ ∈ T ′ the following conditions
hold:




(x.x) ∈ f(x) + g(proj(C1(tk, tk+1), u1), . . . ,
proj(C1(tk, tk+1), uj))
(5.1)
where each input variable ui ∈ U2 is mapped to some output variable
of A1.
(b) For every t ∈ τB.dom, τB(t) satisfies the invariant Inv(τB(0).l[1])
and tl ≤ timer ≤ tu where l = tτB(0).l[2] and u = tτB(0).l[2]+1
(c) The stopping condition Stop = (timer ≥ tu where u = τB(0).l[2]+1)
Using the above definition to construct the abstraction, B will contain
n times the number of states of A2. Each copy of the states of A2 in B
will correspond to a specific [tk, tk+1] time interval. The set of trajectories
originally evolved according to a set of differential equations for each x ∈ X2
as x.x˙ = f(x) + g(u). Now, for a particular time partition [tk, tk+1], the
valuation of each input variable ui ∈ U2 coming from A1 is replaced with the
interval, C1(tk, tk+1) projected onto ui. Each C1(tk, tk+1) (see Definition 3)
can be computed as the convex hull of ReachA1(tk, tk+1).
5.2 Soundness of Abstraction
Proposition 3. Consider a composed HIOA A = A1||A2, such that all input
variables of A2 are output variables of A1. Let B be the abstraction of A2
constructed according to Definition 6. Then, ExecsA ⊆ ExecsB ↓ (A2, V2).
Proof. We will establish that the following relation R ⊆ Q2 ×QB is a simu-
lation relation from A2 to B in the context of A1 which is valid up to time
T . In more detail, consider states of q2,q
′
2 ∈ Q2 which are reachable within
time T such that q2 goes to q
′
2 through either a single action or a trajectory
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of some duration t. Also consider a state qB ∈ QB such that q2RqB. We will




B and that qB goes to q
′
B through
a sequence of actions and trajectories of the same duration.
We define R as q2RqB iff q2 = qB ↓ X2.
It is easy to check that for every initial state of A2 there is a related
initial state of B. Now, we fix q2,q′2 ∈ Q2, qB ∈ QB such that q2 R qB
and q2 ; q
′
2 for some trajectory τ with duration d = τ.dom ∈ [0, T ]. We
construct an execution fragment β as follows: β = ω0 tick ω1 tick . . . ωr,
such that (i) (ω1 ↓ X2) _ (ω2 ↓ X2) _ . . . (ωk ↓ Xm) = τ , (ii) (ω1. fstate d
timer) = qB d timer, (iii) (ωm. lstate d timer) = q′B d timer, (iv) for each
i ∈ {0, . . . ,m}, (ωi ↓ timer) grows monotonically at unit rate, and (v) for
each i, ωi. lstate d timer is one of the time points in the partition Γ. Clearly,
β. fstate = qB and β. lstate = q′B. For condition (v) it is also clear that for
each i, ωi. lstate
tick→ ωi+1. fstate is a valid discrete transition of B as the pre-
state satisfies the guard condition exactly at the time points. It remains to
show that for each i, ωi is a valid trajectory of B. It suffices to show that
ωi ↓ X2 = τ d ωi.dom is a solution of the differential inclusion
d
dt
(τ(t)) ∈ f(τ(t)) + g(proj(C1(ti, ti+1), u1), . . . ,
proj(Cj(ti, ti+1), uj)).
over the interval t ∈ [ti, ti+1]. We know that there exist specific reachable
trajectories ζ1, . . . , ζj of the input variables u1, . . . , uj of A2, and an initial




(τ(t)) = f(τ(t)) + g(ζ1(t), . . . , ζj(t)).
Therefore, it suffices to show that for any t ∈ [ti, ti+1], and any of the in-
put variables ul ∈ U2 of A2, and any reachable input trajectory ζl, ζl(t) ∈
proj(C1(ti, ti+1), ul). C1(ti, ti+1) is constructed from the convex hull of the
reachable set of states of A1 over ti to ti+1. Since the convex hull of a set is
a superset of the original set, ζ1(t) will be contained in proj(C1(ti, ti+1), ul).
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5.3 Abstraction Error Bounds
In the remainder of this chapter, we give an upper bound on the quality of
the overapproximation that is obtained using Definition 6. In other words,
we bound the maximum error between the reachable states of A2 and the
reachable states of its abstraction B. Our main result here establishes that
for any desired error bound  > 0, there exists a time partition generating
a sequence of n − 1 timepoints Γ such that the maximum distance between
ReachTA2 and Reach
T
B is . Although the abstraction B is hybrid, for the sake
of simplicity in this discussion, we restrict A1 and A2 to be hybrid automata
with one location (without discrete switches). The more general cases in-
cluding variable dependencies from multiple automata, general feed forward
networks of automata, and discrete switches within the non-abstracted au-
tomata are discussed at the end of this chapter.
Recall that an output variable of automaton A1 which acts as an input
variable of automaton A2 is abstracted by a set of timing-based inputs in B
(see Definition 6). Proposition 4 bounds the error between the set of actual
input trajectories Π of A2 and the abstracted set of inputs for B.
For the remainder of this chapter, we fix the time partition Γ to be an
equal sized n-partition of [0, T ] defined by n− 1 equidistant time points 0 <
t1 < t2 < . . . < tn−1 < T . We will assume that the set of initial states of A1 is
compact, and the functions on the right-hand side of the differential equations
defining the evolution of the continuous output variables (input variables of
A2) U2 are bounded by a constant, say M . These two assumptions imply
that there exists a constant ρ > 0, such that for any two trajectories τ, τ ′ of
U2, ∀t ∈ [0, T ], |τ(t)− τ ′(t)| ≤ ρ.
Proposition 4. Let η = ω0 tick ω1 tick . . . tick ωn−1 be a ({tick}, V ) hybrid
sequence of duration T , such that (i) ωk. lstate = ωk+1. fstate, (ii) ωk.dom =
[0, tk+1 − tk], and (iii) For all s ∈ [0, tk+1 − tk]
min
t∈[tk,tk+1],τ∈Π













Let τmax be a trajectory which realizes the upper bound in (5.2) for a par-




















Let τmin be a trajectory which realizes the lower bound in (5.2). Since





is bounded by MT
n
+ ρ. Since the MT
n
+ ρ bound also applies to the difference
between each ωk in η and any τ ∈ Π, η also satisfies this bound for all t.
If A1 is deterministic and has a single trajectory τ of length T in Π then
the constraints on the ωk(s) become:
min
t∈[tk,tk+1]
τ(t) ≤ ωk(s) ≤ max
t∈[tk,tk+1]
τ(t). (5.5)
Consequently ρ becomes 0, and we obtain
∀t ∈ [0, T ], |τ(t)− η(t)| ≤ MT
n
. (5.6)
Now we proceed to bound the error between ReachTA2 and Reach
T
B using
Theorem 5. Let the set of initial states of A2 be bounded by a constant γ,
that is, for any x,x′ ∈ Θ2, |x′ − x| ≤ γ. For this part we also assume that
f1 + g1 is bounded by M1 and that f2 and g2 are Lipschitz with constants
Kf and Kg. Recall from our earlier assumption about the dynamics and the
initial states of A1, that there exists a constant ρ > 0 such that for any two
valid input trajectories from A1, ζ1, ζ2 ∈ Π, ∀t ∈ [0, T ], |ζ1(t)− ζ2(t)| ≤ ρ.
Theorem 5. Consider any T -time bounded execution ν of ExecsA. Let ν1
and ν2 be the restrictions of ν to A1 and A2, and let η be the hybrid sequence
constructed from ν2 and Γ according to Proposition 4. For any execution
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β ∈ ExecsTB, and any t ∈ [0, T ],
(ν2 ↓ X2)(t)− (β ↓ X2)(t) ≤ γ exp (Kf t)+
KgM1T
Kfn
(exp (Kf t)− 1) + Kgρ
Kf
(exp (Kf t)− 1)
(5.7)
Proof. Fixing ν, η and β, for any t ∈ [0, T ], we define the error e(t) ∆= |(ν2 ↓
X2)(t)−(β ↓ X2)(t)|. To show this error bound, we first bound the difference
between the differentials ofA2 and its abstraction B. With this, we will derive
an expression for e(t) that can be bounded using Gronwall’s inequality [40].
The executions ν2 and β satisfy the differential equations:
d
dt
((ν2 ↓ X2)(t)) = f2((ν2 ↓ X2)(t)) + g2((ν1 ↓ U2)(t))
d
dt
((β ↓ X2)(t)) = f2((β ↓ X2)(t)) + g2(η(t)),




((ν2 ↓ X2)(t))− d
dt
((β ↓ X2)(t))| =
|f2((ν2 ↓ X2)(t)) + g2((ν1 ↓ U2)(t))−
f2((β ↓ X2)(t))− g2(η(t))|.
(5.8)




((ν2 ↓ X2)(t))− d
dt
((β ↓ X2)(t))| ≤
Kf |(ν2 ↓ X2)(t)− (β ↓ X2)(t)|+Kg|(ν1 ↓ U2)(t)− η(t)|.
(5.9)
Since A1 contains a single location without discrete switches, ν1 ↓ U2 is
a single trajectory and we can use Proposition 4 to bound the difference
between ν1 ↓ U2 and η. We also recognize that | ddt((ν2 ↓ X2)(t)) − ddt((β ↓
X2)(t))| and |(ν2 ↓ X2)(t)−(β ↓ X2)(t)| can be rewritten as ddt(e(t)) and e(t),
respectively. Thus, the error along these executions satisfies:
d
dt




From the assumption that the difference between any two initial conditions of
A2 are bounded by γ, we have ∀ν2 ∈ ExecsTA2 , β ∈ ExecsTB , |ν2(0)−β(0)| ≤ γ,
and e(0) ≤ γ such that the general solution of e(t) is:














Applying the Gronwall-Bellman inequality:






















Carrying out the integration yields the desired bound:
e(t) ≤ KgM1T
Kfn
(exp (Kf t)− 1) +
Kgρ
Kf
(exp (Kf t)− 1) + γ exp (Kf t).
(5.13)
Corollary 6. If the set of start states for A2 is a singleton and there is
a unique input trajectory from A1, then ∀ > 0, ∃n such that ∀t ∈ [0, T ],
e(t) ≤ .
Proof. Consider the bound on the error in (5.7). Since there is a single initial
condition for A2, γ = 0, and since there is a single input trajectory from A1,




(exp (Kf t)− 1) . (5.14)
With n in the denominator, we create B with a sufficiently fine time partition
(sufficiently large n) that achieves any error bound .
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5.4 Generalizations
For the extension of having automata with multiple locations and discrete
switches, the above analysis can still apply if all switches between locations
have identity resets and the right-hand sides of the differentials are piecewise
continuous between locations. In this case, we choose the maximum Lipschitz
constants, Kf and Kg, over all locations of a particular automaton. If the
automaton supplying the input in the abstraction has multiple locations, then
we use the maximum bound M on the differentials describing the evolution
of the input signal. In the most general case, with discrete jumps having non-
identity resets, the abstraction in Definition 6 can still be applied. However,
the conditions for when a discrete jump occurs could be dependent on the
abstracted input signal, so a discrete jump in the abstraction could occur
before or after times when the discrete jump of A2 can occur. The error
between the continuous states of A2 and B at these times will be at least the
difference between the guard and the non-identity reset, and thus, an error
bound  less than this difference cannot be realized around times when these
jumps occur. For variable dependencies from multiple automata, as long
as the differentials of the input signals are bounded, similar results can be
obtained. For general feed forward networks, let the dependencies between
automata in the network be directed edges such that the network forms a
directed graph. In this case, each automaton with at least one dependency
will require the abstraction to generate its reach set. The general network
must be a directed acyclic graph, where an automaton with dependencies is
only abstracted once all automata in its dependencies have been previously





6.1 Tank System Overview
As a demonstration of the abstraction presented in Chapter 5, we consider
a system composed of a sequence of tanks. The tanks hold some fluid flows
from one tank to the next at a constant rate of rLiters
min
. Such tank systems
are commonly used in chemical plants, where the tank sequence is used to
mix different reactants.
Let this particular system be a sequence of n brine tanks. Fresh water
flows into tank 1, while the mixed brine flows from tank 1 to tank 2, tank 2
to tank 3, and so on. The continuous variable xi for each tank represents the
amount of salt (in kilograms) for that tank. The volume of each tank (Liters)
is labeled Vi for each tank. The complete system modeling the amount of






(x2) = k1x1 − k2x2,
d
dt








, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}
For the first equation that models the first tank in the sequence, the instan-
taneous rate at which the total salt decays is directly proportional to the flow
rate, and it is inversely proportional to the volume of the tank. The later
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tanks in the sequence have the mixed brine flowing in from the previous tank,
so the total salt may increase for a time before beginning to decay.
To test the abstraction, we will construct an automaton for each tank in
the sequence for the compositional method. Each automaton will then have
two continuous variables. The first is the continuous variable representing
the amount of salt for that tank, and the second is a continuous timer. The
automaton for the first tank has no input variable, but for the ith tank where
i > 1, the input variable is the continuous variable xi−1 from the previous
tank. For the monolithic model, we will have a single automaton with n+ 1
continuous variables for the salt in each of the n tanks plus the variable for
the timer.
6.2 Experimental Results
Some preliminary experiments have been run to demonstrate the feasibil-
ity of using the abstraction and compare the monolithic method with the
compositional method. The results are presented in Table 6.1. These tests
measured the computational costs in PHAVer for creating the reach sets as
well as measuring the abstraction time for the compositional tests. When
specifying affine dynamics in PHAVer, the partition size for the on-the-fly
partitions that PHAVer uses must be specified. The smaller this parameter,
the more accurate the reachable set of states that is computed. For com-
paring the monolithic and compositional methods it is important to note
that when keeping the on-the-fly partitioning equal between methods, the
reachable set of states computed using the compositional method will be a
subset of the reachable states computed using the monolithic method. This
is demonstrated in Fig. 6.1.
Test cases such as test number four in Table 6.1 showed significant im-
provement over runtime and memory costs of PHAVer when compared with
the monolithic approach. However there are some important observations to
be noted as follows.
Cost of Time Partitioning Consider test cases eight, nine, and ten. The
number of tanks, time bound, and PHAVer partitioning all remain constant
while the number of time partitions used in the abstraction is varied. Here it
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Figure 6.1: From Table 6.1, this is test case four. The green set is the
complete reach set from the monolithic test projected onto x2 and t. The
blue set is the reach set generated from the abstracted automaton that
modeled the second tank in the system.
can be seen, as expected, that increasing the number of time partitions and
hence the number of discrete locations in the abstracted automaton can have
a significant effect on the required PHAVer run time and memory usage.
Inefficiency of Abstraction For test cases 11, 12, and 13, where the num-
ber of tanks is three or four, the abstraction time outside of PHAVer becomes
significant for the compositional method. For this method to become more
effective, the techniques used in the abstraction process need to become more
efficient.
Despite these issues, when considering the exponential costs with respect
to the number of continuous variables in the monolithic approach, the ab-




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This thesis presented verification algorithms for systems that can be de-
composed into noninteracting components that share the same time axis.
For systems whose components form feedforward networks of automata via
shared continuous variables, an abstraction is presented that overapproxi-
mates their interaction such that the verification algorithm can be used on
the abstracted system.
Chapter 2 developed the hybrid automaton model that was used through-
out the thesis. In Chapter 3 we presented the algorithms that verify bounded
safety properties using the component reach sets of the decomposed system.
The main algorithm can give three answers: “Safe”, “Unsafe” , and “Un-
decided”. For each of these answers we show sufficient conditions for the
complete reach set that will ensure that particular answer. Likewise, given a
particular answer, we outline what properties the complete reach set is guar-
anteed to have. Using a case study on two-satellite systems in Chapter 4, we
verified the conjunction avoidance property using realistic orbit parameters.
There were two to three orders of magnitude savings in both total runtime
and peak memory usage using this approach with component reach sets. In
Chapter 5 we considered networks of component automata, where automata
are dependent on one another if they have shared continuous variables. We
presented an abstraction that overapproximates the interaction between the
automata so that the abstractions are only coupled through the shared time
variable as in Chapter 3. We established a bound on the error between the
component automata of the original system and their abstractions. The feasi-
bility of this approach was demonstrated through experiments that computed
this abstraction in Chapter 6.
This suggests several interesting directions for future work.
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Efficiency of Abstraction One of the main drawbacks of the current ab-
straction in Chapter 5 is that it introduces too many additional discrete lo-
cations into the abstracted automaton. The number of discrete locations has
a significant impact on the cost of the reachability computations. Improving
the efficiency of the abstraction will give a better gauge of its effectiveness
in comparison to the monolithic approach.
HA generalizations Since the abstraction was used on case studies of
continuous dynamical systems, additional analysis and extensions will be
required to apply these techniques to hybrid and switched dynamical systems
with resets.
New Abstractions In this thesis, our abstraction involved time partition-
ing where the coupling was overapproximated by rectangular dynamics over
each interval of the time partition. It would be interesting to try linear or
affine approximations within each time interval. In turn, this may reduce the
number of time points necessary in the abstraction to achieve a certain error
bound.
Feedback Our work here only considered feedforward networks of HA. An
interesting direction would be to develop a new approach that creates a useful
abstraction for systems whose components have interactions with feedback.
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